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The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is currently at 
center stage in the international debt crisis, but to the 
general public it is a relatively unfamiliar institution. 
This article is a nontechnical primer on how this official 
group of nations assists its members with balance of 
payments problems. To give readers some perspective, 
the article also explains the purposes, history, and or-
ganization of the IMF and the institution's relationship 
with its largest member, the United States. 
Background 
Objectives 
The IMF's most fundamental objective is to promote the 
growth of international trade and finance and thus 
contribute to worldwide economic growth. Central to 
this objective is the maintenance of a system of interna-
tional payments that is stable, predictable, and effective. 
Therefore, one of the IMF's functions is maintaining 
surveillance over members' exchange rate policies. The 
IMF is constantly on the watch for foreign exchange 
restrictions, predatory exchange rate manipulations, and 
other beggar-my-neighbor types of actions in the interna-
tional financial arena. Another important function of the 
IMF is ensuring the adequacy of international liquidity. 
A third function, the one this article focuses on, is 
providing a mechanism through which member nations 
may obtain funds to finance temporary balance of pay-
ments deficits. 
In the context of this function, it is not unrealistic to 
think of the IMF as a large group of nations that have 
come together and pooled resources. In any period of 
time—a quarter, a year, or longer—some nations in this 
group will experience balance of payments deficits and 
others will experience surpluses. In most cases, those 
nations with deficits can finance the deficits by drawing 
on their stock of international reserves, that is, curren-
cies or other assets that are generally accepted among 
nations. In other cases, however, the deficit nation may 
have an insufficient supply of such assets. That is when 
other nations—through the IMF—can help. By pro-
viding resources to the IMF, those nations with sur-
pluses can make funds available to those with temporary 
balance of payments deficits. 
Any nation can have a balance of payments deficit, 
sometimes due to forces beyond its control. Yet no 
nation can run balance of payments deficits indefinitely, 
with or without the IMF. In the long run, balance of 
payments deficits will be corrected one way or another, 
and the IMF tries to help make this adjustment as prompt 
and orderly as possible. The IMF provides temporary 
financing to member nations with deficits. At the same 
time, it makes recommendations as to how those nations 
may set about correcting their deficits so that IMF 
resources are used in accordance with IMF purposes 
and provisions. (The accompanying box discusses bal-
ance of payments accounting.) 
Origin and Evolution
1 
The IMF was one of two international institutions 
established near the end of World War II to ease the 
transition from a wartime to a peacetime environment 
1 This section is adapted from Kaufman 1981, chap. 17, and we recommend 
this source to readers seeking an in-depth treatment. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review/Summer 1983 
The Balance of Payments 
Just like an individual or a corporation, a country produces a 
deficit when it spends more than it takes in. And the nation (or 
individual or corporation) unavoidably must run down its 
wealth or borrow to finance that deficit. When a deficit occurs 
between countries, resulting from their trade and capital flows 
with one another, it is called a balance of payments deficit. In 
the balance of payments terminology, wealth is called interna-
tional reserves. It is composed of gold, strong currencies that 
other nations are willing to accept, and special drawing rights at 
and to help prevent the recurrence of the turbulent 
economic conditions of the 1930s. The International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World 
Bank) and the IMF were formed by a conference of 44 
nations at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in July 
1944. The World Bank was established to make long-
term reconstruction and development loans; the IMF, to 
provide short-term balance of payments adjustment 
loans. Thus, in a real sense, the World Bank and the IMF 
are complementary institutions.
2 
Over time, changes in the international economic 
environment have required changes in the way the IMF 
the IMF. The table below lists the main types of transactions 
involved in a nation's balance of payments accounting. 
Economists distinguish between the balance of trade and 
the balance of payments, and they use several different, but 
related, measures of both of these concepts (see the table 
below). The official settlements balance is the one meant in the 
accompanying article when references are made to the balance 
of payments. It measures changes in official reserve assets and 




operates. Two of these operational changes are particu-
larly important and have been reflected in major changes 
to the IMF's Articles of Agreement. They are important 
not merely as an illustration of the IMF's responsiveness 
to changing conditions, however. They are fundamental 
2The reader may have heard of a third international financial agency called 
the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). The BIS is a central banking 
organization and is distinct from the World Bank and the IMF. It has recently 
worked with the IMF, however, to provide short-term or emergency "bridge 
financing" to nations with balance of payments difficulties. Most often, BIS 
financing has been provided before IMF lending but in consultation with the 
IMF. 






































SALES of Reserves  PURCHASES of Reserves 
' Each balance in this table is a cumulative measure of all the items above it. 
2 The basic balance is also known as the balance on current and long-term capita) account. 
Adapted from Kaufman 1981, p. 433 
7 to understanding the international financial context 
within which the IMF operates. 
• >4 New International Reserve 
The first of these amendments to the Articles of Agree-
ment, which took effect in 1969, created a new inter-
national reserve asset. Before 1969, the two main forms 
of international reserves had been gold and the curren-
cies of a few major trading nations, particularly the U.S. 
dollar. At any time, only a finite supply of gold exists, 
and during the postwar period, the stock of gold had risen 
very slowly, primarily because (until 1972) a low official 
price of gold held back new production. It was therefore 
unavoidable that most of the growth in international 
reserves be in currency holdings. Most of this growth was 
in U.S. dollars. For example, between 1950 and 1969, 
the amount of foreign-owned dollars rose from around 
$8 billion to around $45 billion. This situation could not 
continue indefinitely. Because of continuing large U.S. 
balance of payments deficits, other nations began to lose 
confidence in the dollar and stepped up their purchases 
of gold from the United States at the then official price of 
$35 per ounce. As a result, dollars came back to the 
United States and so were no longer available to other 
countries as international reserves. To many people, the 
total supply of international reserves then appeared in 
danger of becoming inadequate, a situation which could 
have slowed the growth of international trade. 
After extended negotiations, in 1969 the IMF created 
its own international reserve asset, called the special 
drawing right (SDR). The value of an SDR was initially 
tied to gold, but since 1978 has been tied to the value of a 
group of currencies of the major trading nations. Mem-
bers of the IMF voted to initially distribute about 10 
billion SDRs (officially expressed SDR 10 billion) as a 
supplement to gold and currency holdings. SDRs were 
allotted to member nations in proportion to each nation's 
contribution to the IMF, as defined by its share of the 
aggregate contribution of all nations, or its quota. This 
procedure has been followed in subsequent SDR alloca-
tions, and by mid-1983 about SDR 22 billion had been 
allocated. 
• Floating Exchange Rates 
The second major change in the operations of the IMF is 
reflected in the second amendment to its Articles of 
Agreement, which took effect in 1978. This amendment 
adjusted IMF operations in response to the shift from 
fixed to floating exchange rates which had occurred 
somewhat earlier. 
From the founding of the IMF until the early 1970s, 
IMF members operated under a system of fixed ex-
change rates. The value of their currencies was es-
tablished with respect to gold or to the U.S. dollar. The 
dollar, in turn, was pegged to gold at a price of $35 an 
ounce. This value was enforced by the fact that the 
United States stood ready to buy gold from or sell gold to 
foreign governments at this price. 
In the 1950s and early 1960s, the system of fixed 
exchange rates operated well. But by the late 1960s, 
many years of differing rates of growth and inflation in 
member countries put enormous pressure on fixed 
exchange rates. By the end of 1971, the currencies of 
most industrialized countries were revalued upward 
relative to the U.S. dollar. However, economic condi-
tions continued to vary significantly among the major 
industrial nations, and pressure mounted for basic 
change in the exchange rate regime. In early 1973, the 
fixed exchange rate system was finally dismantled and 
rates for the currencies of most major industrial countries 
were permitted to fluctuate with market conditions. 
Since the IMF had been central to the fixed exchange 
rate system, this change to a floating rate system required 
major changes in its operations. Under the new rules 
formalized in 1978—and still in effect today—the IMF 
permits considerable flexibility in the ways member 
nations can manage exchange rates. Members may 
choose from a variety of alternative exchange rate 
regimes. They may, for example, tie the value of their 
currency to that of another, to the SDR, or even to some 
composite indicator. Members may also simply allow 
their exchange rate to float. Members are not, however, 
permitted to peg to gold and are still discouraged from 
attempting to manage exchange rates so as to achieve 
short-run gains at the expense of other nations.
3 
Organization 
The IMF provides balance of payments assistance to its 
members through a Board of Governors, an Executive 
Board, a managing director, and a staff. 
All nations that become IMF members have a 
representative on the Board of Governors, the IMF's 
3IMF members have adopted several different exchange arrangements. At 
the end of June 1982, 55 had pegged their currencies to that of another nation, 
most commonly the U.S. dollar. Another 39 members had tied their currencies 
to composites such as the SDR. Among members that did not peg, 4 set their 
exchange rates according to a set of indicators. Most remaining members used a 
system of "managed float." (See Hooke 1982, pp. 19-20.) 
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senior decisionmaking body. Each of the member na-
tions is represented by a governor, who typically is a 
minister of finance or a governor of a central bank. 
(Today the IMF has 146 members.) The Board of 
Governors has certain specific powers, as well as all 
powers not expressly conferred on another IMF body. 
The board's specific powers concern, among other 
things, the admission of new members, the allocation of 
SDRs, and the determination of members' quotas. (See 
Hooke 1982, p. 11.) 
Each nation's quota determines the number of votes it 
has, the amount of funds it must make available to the 
IMF, and the amount of funds it can draw from the IMF. 
A member's quota is determined by a formula that 
includes its relative economic size and significance in 
international trade. In essence, the quota is related to the 
economic magnitude of a nation. This is illustrated by the 
fact that today the United States has the largest quota, 
which amounts to 20.6 percent of the total, whereas 
some nations' quotas are well below 1 percent. Quotas 
are periodically reviewed, and changes in relative quota 
shares have taken place. 
Under the direction of the Board of Governors, the 
IMF's Executive Board supervises the institution's day-
to-day business. The managing director heads the Execu-
tive Board, which currently also consists of six appointed 
and sixteen elected executive directors. The five mem-
bers of the IMF with the largest quotas each appoint an 
executive director. Today these members are the United 
States, the United Kingdom, West Germany, France, 
and Japan. Additional executive directors are appointed 
by members whose currencies have been actively used in 
recent IMF transactions. For this reason, Saudi Arabia 
has appointed an executive director since 1978. The 
remaining sixteen executive directors are elected by 
various groups of member countries. 
Besides heading the Executive Board, the managing 
director is chief of the IMF's operating staff, which 
actually conducts the IMF's daily business. The Execu-
tive Board chooses a managing director for a term of five 
years. This individual has traditionally been a citizen of 
one of the IMF's European members. 
Operations 
Sources of Funds 
The IMF obtains funds to assist members with balance 
of payments problems from two major sources: pooled 
funds of members, called subscriptions (or quotas), and 
loans. According to the IMF's balance sheet (Table 1), 
at the end of April 1983, about 82 percent of all IMF 
assets were financed by member subscriptions and about 
15 percent were financed by IMF borrowing.
4 
• Subscriptions 
Member subscriptions are by far the largest item on the 
liability side of the IMF balance sheet. As mentioned 
earlier, the quota broadly reflects a member's economic 
and financial import in the world. When a nation 
becomes a member, it must pay into the IMF an amount 
equal to its quota, and if there are subsequent quota 
increases which the member accepts, it must pay an 
additional amount. Originally, 25 percent of a member 
nation's quota was paid in gold and the remaining 75 
percent in its own currency. Now, however, when quotas 
are increased, 25 percent of the quota increase usually is 
paid in SDRs created by the IMF (or another acceptable 
currency designated by the IMF) and the other 75 
percent in the member's currency. 
The initial process of meeting the own-currency part 
of a nation's quota requirement is hardly more than a 
bookkeeping entry. This is so because each member has 
the option to substitute nonnegotiable, non-interest-
bearing securities for almost all of its currency held by 
the IMF. These,securities become part of the IMF's 
currency holdings and are cashable on demand. Not un-
til some other nation draws a member's currency from 
the IMF does the member's currency actually flow from 
it to the IMF. Any member nation's actual cash trans-
actions with the IMF thus depend on the actions of other 
nations—when they draw or repay its currency. 
• Borrowing 
Although subscriptions are the IMF's basic source of 
funds, the IMF, with Executive Board approval, can also 
obtain resources by borrowing. It can borrow any 
currency and from any source—from private sources like 
commercial banks, for example, as well as from official 
agencies. However, one important restriction on this 
borrowing is that the IMF must obtain the consent of any 
member whose currency it wishes to borrow. 
So far, the IMF has only borrowed from official 
sources, not from private sources, and at the end of April 
4The balance sheet also lists reserves, which are essentially the equity or 
retained earnings of the IMF and which at the end of April 1983 amounted to 
only about 1.4 percent of total assets. The other entries on the liability side are 
small and in the nature of accruals. 
9 Table 1 
The IMF's Balance Sheet1 
as of April 30,1983 
(thousands of SDRs)2 
Assets3 —^^ 
Currencies and securities 64,064,554 
SDR holdings 4,334,909 
Gold holdings4 3,620,396 
Subscriptions receivable — 
Borrowed resources held in suspense 1,780,609 
Charges receivable and accrued 505,334 
Other assets 13,231 
Total assets 74,319,033 
Quotas, Reserves, and Liabilities3 
Quotas 




Remuneration payable 981,121 
I nterest payable and accrued 268,868 
Other liabilities and deferred credits 56,050 

















1 The balance sheet of the IMF's General Department. 
2 An SDR is currently worth about $1.06. 
3SDRs are accounted for under a different set of books and do not appear on the IMF's General Department 
balance sheet except as the IMF receives them in official transactions. As of April 30,1983, about SDR 21.4 
billion had been issued. 
4Gold holdings of the IMF are shown at historical values. 
Source: International Monetary Fund 1983a, p. 189 
1983, borrowing amounted to only 18 percent of sub-
scriptions. This is much less than the guideline the IMF 
established in 1982 for its borrowing: a maximum range 
of between 50 and 60 percent of total IMF subscriptions. 
Much IMF borrowing is done under what are called 
the General Arrangements to Borrow (GAB). The IMF 
and major industrial countries initially entered into these 
arrangements in 1962, and they have been periodically 
renewed since then. The present arrangements, which 
expire in 1985, permit the IMF to borrow the currencies 
of ten industrial countries: Belgium, Canada, France, 
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United King-
dom, the United States, and West Germany. Borrowings 
under these arrangements can finance only drawings 
from the IMF by these countries. The total value of the 
present arrangements is SDR 6.4 billion, but for techni-
cal reasons it would be impossible for the IMF to ever 
lend the full amount. 
The IMF also has a number of other borrowing 
arrangements, many of which are for special purposes 
and with single countries. For example, in May 1981, 
the IMF concluded an agreement with Saudi Arabia to 
borrow up to SDR 8 billion over two years, with the 
possibility of a further draw of SDR 4 billion in the third. 
Interest payments and other terms on IMF borrowing 
arrangements vary considerably. Frequently, but not 
always, interest is charged according to a floating rate. 
Loans are to be repaid within five years under the GAB 
10 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review/Summer 1983 
and within seven years under many of the other arrange-
ments. 
Uses of Funds 
As mentioned earlier, in accordance with the funda-
mental purpose of the IMF, members can draw against 
the IMF's pooled and borrowed funds to finance tempo-
rary balance of payments deficits. Although it is com-
mon to refer to such draws as "borrowing" and IMF 
"loans," the procedure actually consists of a member 
nation purchasing another nation's currency or SDRs 
with its own currency. 
• Terms 
All IMF loans are subject to some degree of con-
ditionality. Conditionality is generally associated with 
economic and financial policies that members, in consul-
tation with the IMF, agree to implement in order to 
obtain IMF resources. These policies are designed to 
correct the member's balance of payments deficit and to 
promote noninflationary economic growth. The terms of 
conditionality are, in a broad sense, similar across those 
IMF lending arrangements that involve stabilization 
programs. IMF stabilization programs known as stand-
by and extended arrangements are generally from one 
to three years in length. Further, they seek to rectify 
balance of payments problems exacerbated by "inappro-
priate exchange rates; subsidies and protectionism; 
distorted prices; inefficient state enterprises; excessive 
government expenditures and large fiscal deficits; in-
flationary money growth; and interest rate controls 
which discourage private savings and distort investment 
patterns" (Regan 1983, p. 2). 
The amount each member can borrow from the IMF 
is expressed as a percentage of its quota. Under guide-
lines adopted in 1981, a member could purchase curren-
cies up to 150 percent of its quota for one year and 450 
percent for three years, excluding purchases under 
special facilities.At the IMF's last annual meeting, in 
September 1983, however, these guidelines were modi-
fied in connection with a proposed increase in quotas. 
(See International Monetary Fund 1983b, p. 3.) Mem-
ber purchases now 
will be subject to annual limits of 102 or 125 per cent of 
quota, three-year limits of 306 or 375 per cent of quota, and 
cumulative limits of408 or 500 per cent of quota, depending 
on the seriousness of the balance of payments needs and the 
strength of the adjustment effort. ... As at present, the 
Executive Board should retain the flexibility to approve 
stand-by or extended arrangements for amounts above the 
access limits in exceptional circumstances. 
Members normally must repurchase their currencies, 
that is, repay their loans, within three to five years. 
Under special circumstances, they may take up to ten 
years. Members can generally purchase funds in install-
ments, or tranches, during the program period as the 
conditions specified under the loan agreement are met. 




Members of the IMF may draw on its financial resources 
to meet their balance of payments needs. Under reserve 
tranche policies, a member can purchase foreign curren-
cies up to an amount equal to the excess of its quota over 
the IMF's holdings of its own currency essentially 
without question, except that funds must be required 
because the member has a balance of payments need. 
These purchases are not subject to policy conditionality, 
carry no interest charges, and have no requirement to 
repurchase.
6 Under credit tranche policies, a member 
can purchase foreign currencies in amounts beyond the 
reserve tranche limit, with each of four tranches being 
equal to 25 percent of the member's quota. Drawings in 
the credit tranches are subject to conditionality and to 
charges and are phased over a period that typically 
ranges from one to three years.
7 
Besides these basic lending programs, the IMF 
operates several lending facilities to help member coun-
tries finance balance of payments deficits stemming from 
specific causes. These facilities, along with the tranches, 
are described in Table 2. Some of these facilities are 
financed fully with the IMF's quota resources. As 
discussed earlier, some are financed in part by loans 
from individual countries or groups of countries. For 
5The IMF levies three charges. One is a service charge on all drawings 
except those in the reserve tranche (described in the next section). Another is a 
charge on standby arrangements not unlike a commitment fee charged by a 
commercial bank. The third is an annual charge against IMF holdings of a 
member's currency when those holdings exceed the member's quota. (See 
Hooke 1982, p. 32.) 
6 Reserve tranche purchases do, however, have an opportunity cost equal to 
the foregone interest income on funds withdrawn. 
7 A nation's reserve tranche depends on the actions of other nations as well 
as its own. This is so because the reserve tranche is the difference between the 
nation's currency quota and the IMF's actual holdings of its currency. Thus, as 
other nations draw its currency out of the IMF, the nation's reserve tranche 
increases, and as other nations pay its currency into the IMF, the nation's 
reserve tranche decreases. 
1 1 Table 2 
The IMF's Financial Facilities 








Use of a member's own liquid reserves. 
Credit available in four tranches in connection 
with standby arrangements; each tranche equiva-
lent to 25 percent of a member's quota. 
Assistance to members with very weak balance 
of payments or structural balance of payments 
problems that need a longer period of adjust-
ment than is typically provided in standbys. 
Resources available to members with standby or 
extended arrangements under the credit tranches 
or the extended facility that need more funds 
than those arrangements provide. (Funds no long-
er committed under this program after early 1982.) 
Assistance beyond limits on other facilities to 
members with balance of payments problems that 
are large relative to quotas; in effect, an extension 
of supplementary financing; used in association 
with standby and extended facilities. 
Assistance to members with balance of payments 
problems resulting from export shortfalls that are 
both temporary and due largely to factors beyond 
the member's control. 
Financing available to members to contribute to 
an international buffer stock accepted as suitable 
by the IMF. 
Source: Hooke 1982, pp. 41 -51 
example, most of the large loans made in connection with 
stabilization programs over the past few years have been 
financed in part by loans made by Saudi Arabia and 
some industrial countries. Depending on a member's 
situation, it can purchase funds from a combination of 
these special programs. The number of special facilities 
and their uses vary with world economic conditions, as is 
apparent in the accompanying graph. 
The IMF generally finances only part of a country's 
balance of payments deficit. However, when the IMF 
makes funds available to a member in connection with a 
policy adjustment program in that country, this frequent-
ly has the effect of keeping the world's private capital 
markets open and accessible to that country. In addition, 
IMF assistance is sometimes made in loose association 
with World Bank lending. Although the World Bank is 
primarily concerned with long-term project financing, 
more than 10 percent of its lending is now for "structural 
adjustment," a purpose which is in some ways similar to 
that of IMF lending (Money for the fund, 1983, p. 16). 
The United States and the IMF 
Without question, operations of the IMF affect the 
economy of the United States, it largest member nation. 
These effects are both indirect and direct. Over the 
postwar period, the IMF has made a significant contri-
bution toward international financial stability and thus 
toward its most fundamental goal—fostering world trade 
and economic growth. Although such indirect benefits 
are extremely difficult to quantify, they undoubtedly 
have accrued to citizens of the United States as well as 
those of other nations. IMF operations also have a 
number of important direct effects on U.S. federal 
government financing which are easier to quantify. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review/Summer 1983 
Use of IMF Resources 
as of April 30,1972-83 
(billions of SDRs) 
Source: International Monetary Fund 1983a, p. 87 
These are discussed below. 
Since the IMF's creation, other members have fre-
quently drawn dollars from the U.S. quota subscription, 
and the United States has also drawn currencies from 
other members' subscriptions. The United States, of 
course, has drawn funds from the IMF for exactly the 
same reason that other nations have—to finance balance 
of payments deficits. U.S. drawings to date have totaled 
about $6.5 billion, the second largest use of any member. 
It is worth noting, however, that the United States has 
never drawn in excess of the reserve tranche and thus in a 
real sense has not been a net debtor of the IMF. 
As pointed out earlier, when the IMF increases 
member quotas, this essentially results in a bookkeeping 
transaction for the member, at least with regard to the 75 
percent of the quota increase payable in its own currency. 
This is just as true for the United States as it is for other 
members. Nevertheless, a quota increase requires con-
gressional authorization and appropriation in the United 
States. 
Funds the United States subscribes in dollars are not 
transferred to the IMF by the Treasury until the IMF 
actually needs additional U.S. dollars, perhaps because 
some other nation has drawn them. If this occurs, though, 
the U.S. government records an offsetting decline in its 
securities held by the IMF. Thus, transferring dollars to 
the IMF does not result in net budget outlays, nor does 
it directly affect the size of the U.S. budget deficit. 
Likewise, when another member nation returns dollars 
to the IMF, no change occurs in the U.S. federal budget. 
IMF transfers to and from the U.S. Treasury have varied 
widely from year to year, producing cash outflows for 
the Treasury in some years and inflows in others. 
Transfers of dollars to and from the IMF do affect the 
13 Treasury's cash position and borrowing requirements, 
however. For example, when the IMF needs dollars, the 
Treasury has to obtain them, which normally entails 
borrowing. Thus, when other nations draw dollars from 
the IMF, the cost to the United States is the interest it 
must pay to obtain the funds. This is partially offset by 
the interest the IMF pays the United States for the use of 
its dollars.
8 
The Treasury has recently estimated the direct net 
cost to the United States of IMF membership. This 
computation is complex and involves a number of vari-
ables, including the amount of dollars drawn by other 
nations, the amount of time for which these dollars are 
drawn, the rate of interest paid by the IMF, the 
Treasury's cost of financing the dollar outflow by 
borrowing in the open market, and capital gains or losses 
on U.S. holdings denominated in SDRs. This computa-
tion puts the average net cost to the United States of 
participation in the IMF at about $107 million per year 
from the beginning of 1970 to the end of 1982, with 
considerable annual variability. (See Regan 1983, p. 
10.) This direct cost of membership appears modest 
considering the benefits to the United States of world-
wide economic and financial stability. 
Summary 
The United States and other members of the IMF have 
for almost 40 years used the IMF to ease balance of 
payments adjustments. Over the years, the IMF has 
adapted to the changing international economic environ-
ment. The basic approach the IMF has used to assist 
members, however, has not changed. Members sub-
scribe funds to the IMF in an amount related to their 
economic size, and the IMF borrows member curren-
cies. Members, in turn, can purchase these currencies 
with their own currencies and use them to settle their 
international accounts. In exchange for being able to 
purchase international reserves, members adopt eco-
nomic programs aimed at correcting their balance of 
payments deficits. The IMF provides its assistance 
through a number of different programs which vary with 
international economic conditions. For the United 
States, the IMF's largest member, the direct cost of this 
membership seems modest compared to the worldwide 
economic benefits of IMF activities. 
8The rate of interest (called remuneration) on a portion of reserve tranche 
positions is currently set at 85 percent of the SDR rate. The interest rate on 
SDRs is a weighted average of government security rates in the five countries 
whose currencies are used to define the SDR. 
14 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review/Summer 1983 
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